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Abstract
We find that European SMEs significantly increased their net trade credit
to sales ratio during the Great Recession. Therefore, for the aggregate of
SMEs, trade credit did not provide any buffer to the contraction in bank
loans. In fact, through increased net trade credit SMEs suffered a squeeze
in their liquidity. From our analysis it emerges that there is a case for pol-
icy action directed at removing obstacles to the real activity of SMEs due to
a liquidity squeeze induced by their weak bargaining power in trade credit
relations. We explore various policies that could be implemented to relieve
SMEs from the liquidity squeeze induced by the increase in their receivables.
Keywords: trade credit, financial crises, SMEs
∗The authors gratefully acknowledge the CEPR/Assonime Programme on Restarting European
Long Term Investment Finance (RELTIF) for financial support.




The recovery of European economies from the Great Recession has been very
slow. One possible explanation is that small and medium size enterprises (SMEs),
which are the backbone of European economies, have been severely hit by the dry-
up of financing that has followed the global financial crisis. Accounting for more
than 99 percent of the total number of firms, almost 70 percent of employment
and close to 60 percent of GDP in the EU-28, SMEs performance has clearly a
large effect on the macroeconomy.
SMEs are particularly vulnerable to financial shocks, as they typically are
more dependent on bank credit than larger firms and have limited access to al-
ternative market-based sources of finance, such as corporate bonds. For these
reasons, many have advocated policies targeted to SMEs in order to relieve them
from tight financial constraints (Cœure´, 2013).1 The asymmetric impact of finan-
cial shocks across firms of different size has been a central theme in the so-called
credit channel explaining contractionary effects of monetary tightening (Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1994).
One objection to the special position of SMEs in credit markets and to the
rationale for targeted policies comes from the fact that SMEs are highly hetero-
geneous and this applies as well to their financial vulnerability. In normal times,
aware of their inability to access financial markets, SMEs may anticipate future
tightening of bank credit constraints by reducing their leverage. As a result, SMEs
may hold significant cash reserves, which, though inefficient, may provide an in-
surance against shocks to bank credit supply (see Ferrando, Marchica and Mura,
2014).
Furthermore, and related to our analysis, it has been argued that SMEs may
loosen their constraints on official sources of borrowing through trade credit (Gio-
vannini et al., 2015; Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2013). The
question of whether trade credit might have softened the negative shock on bank
credit for SMEs during the Great Recession is therefore highly relevant. Although
there is a vast literature on trade credit and its determinants, there are only a few
studies on the behavior of trade credit during financial crises or episodes of sharp
tightening of bank credit to firms. Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007) and
Love and Zaidi (2010) studied the behavior of trade credit during financial crises
in 1990s in Asia and Mexico. They find that during those financial crises in emerg-
1”Yet, based on survey information provided by the ECB (the Survey on Access to Finance of
Enterprises, SAFE), we see that SMEs’ profits, liquidity buffers and own capital have developed
less favorably than have those of large firms during the crisis” (Cœure´, 2013).
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ing economies, trade credit did not compensate for the contraction of bank credit.
Moreover, they also find evidence that SMEs faced unfavorable terms in trade
credit relations and experienced a lengthening of the payments for their receiv-
ables. However, previous results are related to a small set of countries and, more-
over, datasets used did not allow for a simultaneous analysis of the behavior of
large and small firms.
We have focused on the behavior of net trade credit in a large dataset of firms
in 31 European countries (Coricelli and Frigerio, 2016), which covers the period
of the Great Recession and five years prior to that. The Great Recession provides
a unique laboratory, as several countries experiences simultaneously a financial
crisis. Net trade credit represents the difference between receivables, i.e. delayed
payments on sales, and payables, i.e. delayed payments on purchases of inputs, of
a firm. An increasing net trade credit to sales ratio, NTCS, indicates a squeeze on
liquidity available to the firm. This channel is particularly relevant during financial
crises, periods in which firms are subject to tight constraints on their sources of
external finance. Net trade credit is also a key indicator of the redistribution of
liquidity across firms and thus particularly suitable as an indicator of heterogeneity
among firms and heterogeneous effects of financial shocks across firms.
2 The liquidity squeeze on SMEs
In contrast to commonly held views, we find that European SMEs significantly
increased their net trade credit to sales ratio, NTCS, during the Great Recession
(Fig. 1). Therefore, for the aggregate of SMEs, trade credit did not provide any
buffer to the contraction in bank loans. In fact, through increased net trade credit
SMEs suffered a squeeze in their liquidity.
Table 1 shows the behavior of different financing and investment items in
firms’ balance sheets during different phases of the Great Recession. Firms are
divided in quintiles in relation to the behavior of their net trade credit and, in
particular, they are ordered in terms of increasing net trade credit to total assets.
Several interesting facts can be inferred.
First, firms experiencing the sharpest increase in net trade credit were char-
acterized by only a marginal increase in bank loans.2 Thus, the increase in net
lending to other firms was not compensated by a corresponding increase in bank
loans. Second, and related to the first finding, the liquidity squeeze operating
2Note that changes on the liability side of the budget are reported with reverse sign, so that
sign (-) indicates an increase of the share to total assets.
3
Table 1: Behavior of financing and investment items relatively to net trade credit
Variation (p.p.) of the Shares in Total Assets of:
Net Fixed Fin. Oth. Sh.
Trade Stocks Cash Assets Debt Liab. Funds
Period Credit (+) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-)
2007-2009
Quintile:
I −25.0 3.6 8.4 3.5 1.6 3.1 4.8
II −5.7 0.8 2.5 1.5 1.0 0.8 −1.0
III 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.0 −2.5
IV 7.6 −0.8 −1.8 −0.2 −0.2 −1.3 −3.3
V 28.3 −3.7 −8.4 −2.1 −2.7 −5.1 −6.1
2009-2011
Quintile:
I −27.0 3.7 7.3 1.9 2.1 5.7 6.3
II −6.1 1.2 1.9 −0.1 1.7 0.8 0.7
III 0.0 0.3 0.1 −0.9 1.6 −0.1 −1.0
IV 6.3 −0.4 −2.2 −1.7 0.8 −1.0 −1.7
V 26.5 −3.2 −9.5 −3.5 −1.4 −3.8 −5.1
2011-2013
Quintile:
I −24.7 3.6 8.2 2.7 1.5 1.6 7.0
II −5.3 1.0 2.3 0.5 1.3 −0.1 0.3
III 0.4 0.2 0.5 −0.4 1.3 −0.6 −1.3
IV 6.3 −0.5 −1.4 −1.1 0.4 −1.7 −2.0
V 26.7 −3.4 −7.7 −2.8 −1.8 −5.1 −5.8
Source: our elaboration on Amadeus data.
The quintile classification is based on the variations of the ratio between net trade credit and
total assets within each period. Data in the table represent the changes in percentage points
of individual budget items, each represented as a share of Total Assets. Figures are obtained
as simple averages at the firm level. As indicated in the first row, changes on the assets side
of the budget are reported as increases (actual sign, +), while changes on the liability side of
the budget are reported as decreases (reverse sign, -). In this way, the sum of the entries in
each row sum to zero.
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Figure 1: Average NTCS by Firm Size and Year
Source: our elaboration on AMADEUS data
through trade credit is apparent by looking at the fall in cash holdings for firms
increasing their net trade credit. Finally, firms experiencing the largest increase in
net trade credit display a significant negative adjustment of both inventories and
fixed capital investment, suggesting that the liquidity squeeze through trade credit
exacerbated tightening of financial constraints, which, in turn, induced adverse
effects on real activity.
We next turn the attention to the behavior of financing items for SMEs that
experienced the deepest fall in investments, both in inventories and fixed capital,
and we contrast such behavior with that of SMEs performing well. To emphasize
the relevance of firm size, we group micro and small firms together, contrasting
such group with the aggregate of medium and large firms.3
Fig. 2 contrasts the behavior of the main financing items in firms suffering the
3The alternative comparison between SMEs and large companies would be distorted by the
fact that too few observations are related to large firms. In addition, we noticed from preliminary
descriptive analysis that mid-size companies tend to behave quite similarly to large firms rather
than to the micro and small ones.
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largest fall (first quartile) in investment and inventories with the behavior of those
same items in firms performing better (fourth quartile) during the crisis period.
Firms that experienced the sharpest fall in inventories and in fixed capital were
characterized by a significant fall in bank loans and by a sizable increase in net
trade credit. By contrast, in firms that performed better in terms of inventories
and of capital expenditure, the main financing items, including net trade credit,
behaved as a mirror image of what found for the worst performing firms. The
combination of these opposite behaviors generates the differences between first
and fourth quartile that are clearly shown in Fig. 2. It clearly emerges that net
trade credit to sales ratio strongly contributes to these differences.
The evidence discussed so far provides the basis for a deeper econometric
analysis, which aims at verifying that the stylized facts reported above really cap-
ture the role of firm size rather than other factors.
3 Econometric evidence
In Coricelli and Frigerio (2016) we analyze whether the findings of the descrip-
tive analysis survive to econometric analysis that controls for variables that may
confound the preliminary results.
Focusing on net trade credit as the main channel of redistribution of liquidity
across firms, we find in the econometric analysis that firm size plays a key role
in predicting an increase in net trade credit during the Great Recession. Further
analysis shows that the increase in net trade credit of SMEs reflects their weaker
bargaining power in bilateral relations with larger firms. We find, in line with
previous approaches, that firms with larger liquidity (higher cash-flow generation)
tend to provide larger net trade credit. By contrast, we find no evidence that firms
with easier access to bank loans increase their lending in the trade credit market.
Overall, we find that, in addition to some redistribution from liquidity-rich firms to
liquidity-poor firms, the increase in net trade credit by SMEs is explained by their
weaker bargaining power and thus it does not reflect an efficient redistribution of
liquidity.
Furthermore, if trade credit reflected an efficient redistribution of liquidity
from less to more financially constrained firms, we should observe that changes
in net trade credit induce positive real effects on firms’ performance. In fact, we
find evidence that the increase in net trade credit reduces both employment and
fixed investments of firms. This lends support to the liquidity squeeze channel
through which trade credit operated during the Great Recession, with significant
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adverse effects on SMEs. As mentioned before, we find that differential bargain-
ing power in favor of large firms is one of the main factors responsible for the
liquidity squeeze affecting SMEs through trade credit. Policies to counteract such
inefficiency, i.e. stronger bargaining power of large versus small firms, are hard to
implement. Nevertheless, such inefficiency has sizable real effects and calls for
policy responses.
In addition to net trade credit, the behavior of gross trade credit, which is
the value of payables or receivables, might have played a crucial role during the
Great Recession. Gross trade credit is crucial for understanding the relationship
between production and credit chains. Indeed, firms are part of production chains
and these chains are related to flows of credit among firms at different nodes of the
chain. Even with zero net trade credit positions, financial shocks leading to a fall
in gross trade credit can potentially lead to large real shocks through the collapse
of production chains.
Furthermore, the position of firms in different stages of the production chain
may imply that for purely technological reasons firms are characterized by dif-
ferent net trade credit positions. In this respect, the so-called upstreamness of
different production activities is relevant for determining the sign of net trade
credit positions. Firms that are far away from the final goods market tend to be
net creditor in the chain, as they sell inputs to other firms. In particular, it is likely
that especially in manufacturing activities small firms act as suppliers of interme-
diate products for larger firms. Therefore, positive net trade credit positions result
from technological factors and do not reflect financial constraints or other possible
imperfections. However, these considerations are important as structural charac-
teristics, but do not necessarily imply changes in net trade credit positions during
the financial crisis. Indeed, we find some stability of the credit chains during the
financial crisis, with the response of receivables to a change in payables rather
stable over time, with little changes during the Great Recession.
In summary, there is evidence that the increase in NTCS of SMEs during the
Great Recession was not driven by demand or by ”technological” factors (up-
streamness), but rather by the transfer of liquidity from SMEs to large firms re-




From our analysis it emerges that there is a case for policy action directed at re-
moving obstacles to the real activity of SMEs due to a liquidity squeeze induced
by their weak bargaining power in trade credit relations. Punitive actions in princi-
ple could shield SMEs from undesirable increases in delays in payments for their
sales. This type of actions have been embodied in EU regulations, which intro-
duce a limit to 60 days for delays in payments to suppliers, after which debtors
will incur penalties. However, the weak bargaining power of SMEs originates
from their difficulty in finding new partners for their sales. Going through legal
actions will expose them to the threat of losing main partners for their products.
Therefore, more effective actions should be envisaged. These could focus
on increasing the liquidity (marketability) of receivables of SMEs, which can be
achieved through several mechanisms: insurance and securitization, asset-based
lending (i.e. lending secured using accounts receivable as collateral) and factoring
(which is a transaction where a company, the factor, purchases receivables from
the seller/supplier and provides cash in advance at a discount). Such mechanisms
are at work in normal times, although they cover a limited amount of trade credit
and their relevance vary across countries.
As for receivables securitizations, Katz and Blatt (2008) argues that ”consider-
able barriers to entry exist; and sellers generally require both significant size and
credit quality to successfully fund through receivables securitization”. Indeed,
capital market participants tend to consider the credit quality of the receivables
of smaller suppliers/sellers with some disbelief. Central banks could initiate pro-
grams of securitization of receivables of SMEs by guaranteeing securities issued
on receivables. Differently from financial institutions, SMEs cannot (or they are
not prepared to) interact in a direct way with central banks. For this reason, an
intervention based on the securitization of trade credit would also require to iden-
tify those entities (such as the Italian Confidi 4 ) that may operate as intermediate
subjects, also through the use of pooling techniques.
Trade credit insurance, servicing outsourcing and appropriate structuring may
ease the access of micro and small suppliers/sellers to receivables securitization,
by softening the effect of undesirable increases in payment terms during financial
crises. But insurance for trade credit may be perceived too costly during nor-
mal times, periods in which default probabilities are low and, moreover, potential
4Confidi is an institution that provides guarantees for bank loans received by SMEs. It pools
SMEs loan applications and provides collectively guarantees to banks.
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payment difficulties in trade credit transactions can be buffered through access to
bank loans. During financial crises the buffer provided by bank loans evaporates,
leaving the trade credit market without its ”lender of last resort”. Moreover, when
the increase in receivables derives from a lengthening of payment terms rather
than default of the customer, it is hard to design an insurance scheme. Therefore,
insurance helps in absorbing the effects of default of customers but does not have
an impact on the transfer of liquidity that large firms can obtain from SMEs as a
result of higher bargaining power that large firms exert during financial crises.
A more viable solution for SMEs may leverage on more traditional instru-
ments of invoice discounting, such as asset-based lending and factoring. Factoring
can be a very important tool in providing financing to SMEs, since it is well suited
for financing receivables from large firms when those receivables represent debts
of customers with a higher credit standing than suppliers. However, the devel-
opment of factoring to meet the financing needs of small-sized suppliers requires
policies aimed to remove fundamental obstacles. Klapper (2006) shows that fac-
toring is larger in countries with a better credit information. The development of
factoring requires information on the quality of the assets (receivables). Gathering
information for a large number of small positions is rather costly. This is the rea-
son why, in developing countries, factoring is typically done on a recourse basis
(pro-solvendo) so that the factor can collect from the supplier/seller in the case
that the customer/buyer defaults.5 An additional problem during financial crises
is that assessing the creditworthiness of each individual firm is complicated by the
interlocking of positions through credit chains.
Therefore, interventions are needed to remove barriers to all these tools and
mechanisms that are suited for financing SMEs’ receivables, especially during fi-
nancial crises. For those firms with a lower access to finance, in particular, these
tools should be strengthened through mutual financial institutions and specific in-
centive and guarantee schemes, possibly supported by governments and central
banks (ECB for countries in the euro zone). This would permit SMEs to avoid the
liquidity squeeze induced by delayed payments from larger firms without endan-
gering their production networks.
In addition to remove barriers to ordinary factoring, it may also be useful to
promote alternative solutions, such as reverse factoring, that are designed to over-
come institutional barriers. In reverse factoring, the factor purchases receivables
only from selected buyers, such as large high-quality firms. In this way, the factor
5By contrast, in developed countries factoring is more frequently done on a non-recourse basis
(pro-soluto), so that the factor assumes most of the default risk (see Klapper, 2006).
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(a) benefits from lower information costs and credit risk and (b) it also makes con-
tact with SMEs that are suppliers of high-quality customers. At the same time, the
supplier/seller increases its access to short-term financing and the customer/buyer
can negotiate better terms with its suppliers. A success story of reverse factoring
has been the program ”Cadenas Productivas” (”Productive Chains”) implemented
by the Nacional Financiera (Nafin) development bank in Mexico (Klapper, 2006).
The chains connect large buyers and small suppliers. A particularly interesting
and relevant aspect of such program has been the creation of an internet-based
platform to allow on-line factoring services to SME suppliers.6
Our study shows that policies that would reduce the liquidity squeeze induced
by increased receivables in the context of financial crises would lead to sizable
real effects, both on fixed investments and employment. Empirical evidence re-
veals that the magnitude of the implied change in investments is large, with a gap
of more than 4 percentage points between the SMEs in industries with largest in-
crease in NTCS and large firms in industries with the smallest increase. Similarly,
an increase of one standard deviation in NTCS produces a reduction of 12 percent-
age points in the wage bill and of 0.6 percent in employment, indicating that the
effects of increasing net trade credit on wages and employment are quantitatively
relevant.
Finally, we suggest that policies reducing the liquidity squeeze induced by
increased receivables, in addition to supporting SMEs, may also constitute a vital
part of securing the supply chain across business cycles.
6Klapper (2006) states that ”the suppliers are typically small, risky firms who generally cannot
access any other financing from the formal banking sector. The program allows small suppliers to
use their receivables from Big Buyers to receive working capital financing, effectively transferring
their credit risk to their high-quality customers to access more and cheaper financing. The role of
Nafin is only to coordinate on-line factoring services and not to factor receivables directly. The
services provided by Nafin are to operate and promote the electronic factoring platform, encourage
the participation of large buyers, and educate SMEs on how to take advantage of the program.
Nafin was created by the Mexican government in 1934 as a state-owned development bank”.
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